The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Hosmer, Stephen T. creator author. text bibliography Electronic books. History. cau Santa Monica, CA Rand �2001 2001 monographic eng remote 1 online resource (xxxi, 155 pages). This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations. Introduction -- He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule -- He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms -- He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated -- Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions -- Damage to "dual-use" infrastructure generated growing pressure -- Damage to military forces and KLA "resurgence" generated little pressure -- He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected -- He probably also worried about threat of future invasion -- He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover -- Concluding observations. Stephen T. Hosmer. At head of title: Project Air Force. "Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release, distribution unlimited." Use copy Restrictions unspecified star MiAaHDL Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL Includes bibliographical references (pages 139-155). e-yu--- Milo�sevi�c, Slobodan 1941-2006 Milo�sevi�c, Slobodan 1941-2006 Milo�sevi�c, Slobodan (1941-2006) Milosevic, Slobodan ((1941- ...) Organisation du trait�e de l'Atlantique nord. Kosovo (Republic) History Civil War, 1998- Kosovo (Republic) HISTORY General POLITICAL SCIENCE Security (National & International) Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) Since 1998 fast DR2087 .H67 2001eb 949.7103 Conflict over Kosovo Hosmer, Stephen T. Santa Monica, CA : Rand, �2001 (DLC) 2001031973 (OCoLC)46976540 Online Rand research documents 0585425388 9780585425382 9780833032386 0833032380 0833030035 9780833030030 2001031973 22573/cttd7xw JSTOR http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=63506 Use copy MiAaHDL N$T 021010 20190114101355.0 ocm50763967 eng