rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    non sort: A
    title: Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine's Tradition
  name:
    name part: Gubelmann, Reto.
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
    role:
      role term: aut
    role:
      role term: http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
  name:
    name part: SpringerLink (Online service)
  type of resource: text
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: gw
    date issued: 2019
    edition: 1st ed. 2019.
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: electronic resource
    reformatting quality: access
    form: remote
    extent: XIX, 286 p. 5 illus., 3 illus. in color. online resource.
  abstract: At the intersection of epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of science, this exciting new book examines the epistemic limits of empirical science. It makes a unique contribution to research on epistemological naturalism in Quine's tradition by criticizing the position based on first-order data from empirical psychology and the history of natural science. This way, it meets the naturalist on their own ground not only regarding subject matter, but also regarding their epistemic methods. The book explores the works of a variety of philosophers in the field, including W. V. Quine, Penelope Maddy, Tyler Burge, Stathis Psillos and Howard Sankey. By carefully considering experimental results from behaviourism as well as developmental and perceptual psychology, Gubelmann finds that none of these disciplines can furnish the epistemic means to successfully naturalize the central cognitive preconditions of scientific theorizing. Furthermore, Gubelmann presents novel arguments for the claims that epistemological naturalists are committed to scientific realism, and that they are unable to defend this position. Based on these results, Gubelmann concludes that epistemology is not part of empirical science, which directly contradicts epistemological naturalism.
  table of contents: 1. Introduction -- 2. Quine I: The Bold Physicalism of Word and Object -- 3. Quine II: The Evolutionary-Perceptional Account -- 4. Burge: Proto-Predicates in Perceptual Representations -- 5. Maddy: Conceiving Logic as an Innate Cognitive Mechanism -- 6.Quine's Empiricist Justificatory Monism -- 7. Why Justificatory Monism Needs Scientific Realism -- 8. Scientifically Defending Realism I: Psillos' Holistic Approach -- 9. Scientifically Defending Realism II: Maddy's Piecemeal Realism -- 10. Conclusion.
  note: by Reto Gubelmann.
  subject:
    topic: Epistemology
  subject:
    topic: Philosophy and science
  subject:
    topic: Epistemology
  subject:
    topic: Philosophy of Science
  classification: BD143-237
  classification: 120
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Springer eBooks
  identifier: 9783030245245
  identifier: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5
  record info:
    record creation date: 190727
    record change date: 20191028091851.0
    record identifier: 978-3-030-24524-5