rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market
  name:
    name part: Lin, Peng.
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: Feng, Xiaojun.
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: Zhang, Qian.
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: SpringerLink (Online service)
  type of resource: text
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: gw
    date issued: 2014
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: electronic resource
    reformatting quality: access
    form: remote
    extent: XIII, 81 p. 18 illus. online resource.
  abstract: This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems. Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users’ dynamic demands. Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues.
  table of contents: Introduction -- Auction Mechanisms -- Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums -- Spectrum Group-buying Framework -- Flexauc Auction: Serving Dynamic Demand in Wireless Markets -- Conclusions.
  note: by Peng Lin, Xiaojun Feng, Qian Zhang.
  subject:
    topic: Computer science
  subject:
    topic: Computer communication systems
  subject:
    topic: Electrical engineering
  subject:
    topic: Game theory
  subject:
    topic: Computer Science
  subject:
    topic: Computer Communication Networks
  subject:
    topic: Communications Engineering, Networks
  subject:
    topic: Game Theory
  classification: TK5105.5-5105.9
  classification: 004.6
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Springer eBooks
  related item:
    title info:
      title: SpringerBriefs in Computer Science
  identifier: 9783319067995
  identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06799-5
  record info:
    record creation date: 140520
    record change date: 20151204191553.0
    record identifier: 978-3-319-06799-5