rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Designing Democracy
    sub title: Ideas for Better Rules
  name:
    name part: Gersbach, Hans.
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: SpringerLink (Online service)
  type of resource: text
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: gw
    date issued: 2005
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: electronic resource
    reformatting quality: access
    form: remote
    extent: XI, 244 p. online resource.
  abstract: While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have yet to experience an alternative. In this book the vision we propose is that the potential of democ­ racies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should be committed to. We present a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to im­ prove the functioning of democracies. The book falls into two parts. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. We suggest that a judicious combina­ tion of these two elements as a dual mechanism can alleviate a wide range of political failures, while at the same time adhering to the founding principles of democracies. The second part presents new rules for decision-making and agenda setting. Together with modern communication devices, these rules can sometimes transcend the limitations of liberal VI Preface democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. Examples of such rules include the flexible majority rule where the size of the ma­ jority required depends on the proposal, or the rule that only those belonging to the winning majority can be taxed.
  table of contents: Incentive Contracts and Elections -- Overview -- Unobservability and Short-Termism in Long-Term Policies -- Short-Termism and Competition for Incentive Contracts -- Reelection Thresholds -- Effort Incentives and Monetary Rewards -- Limits to Incentive Contracts in Politics -- Rules for Decision-Making and Agenda Setting -- Overiview -- Examples for Agenda Rules -- Flexible Majority Rules -- Democratic Mechanisms -- Fair Division.
  note: by Hans Gersbach.
  subject:
    topic: Political science
  subject:
    topic: Economic theory
  subject:
    topic: Public finance
  subject:
    topic: Economic policy
  subject:
    topic: Law and economics
  subject:
    topic: Economics
  subject:
    topic: Public Economics
  subject:
    topic: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
  subject:
    topic: Political Science
  subject:
    topic: Economic Policy
  subject:
    topic: Law and Economics
  classification: HJ9-9940
  classification: 336
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Springer eBooks
  identifier: 9783540266983
  identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b137964
  record info:
    record creation date: 100301
    record change date: 20151204141957.0
    record identifier: 978-3-540-26698-3