rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Endogenous Public Policy and Contests
  name:
    name part: Epstein, Gil S.
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: Nitzan, Shmuel.
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: SpringerLink (Online service)
  type of resource: text
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: gw
    date issued: 2007
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: electronic resource
    reformatting quality: access
    form: remote
    extent: XVI, 221 p. online resource.
  abstract: This book studies endogenous policy determination focusing on the role of interest groups and their lobbying efforts in the determination of public policy. Applying strategic contest theory as the basic methodology, it clarifies the fundamental parameters that determine the behavior of the government and the interest groups - the two contestants for the "prizes" associated with public policy. The fundamental parameters are the objective of the government, political culture, the contest success function, the stakes of the interest groups and their characteristics. The analysis focuses on the relationship between these parameters and public policy, the contest winning probabilities of the interest groups and their efforts. Comprehensive illustrations of the usefulness of the proposed approach are provided in five specific cases: the determination of monopoly price, privatization policy, migration quotas, minimum wage and promotion in tournaments. .
  table of contents: The Basic Contest -- The Policy Contest -- Contest Rationalization ? Microfoundations -- The Extended Contest: With Government -- Endogenous Public Policy -- Culture, Politicization and Relative Rent Dissipation -- Lobbying and Compromise -- The Policy Effect -- Effort and Performance -- Prizes (Size and Distribution) and Efforts -- Asymmetry and Corrective Public Policy -- The Extended Contest: Without Government -- The Social Cost of Rent Seeking when Consumer Opposition Influences Monopoly Behavior -- Strategic Restraint -- Applications -- Monopoly-price Determination -- Privatization -- Migration Policy -- Minimum Wage -- Tournaments.
  note: by Gil S. Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan.
  subject:
    topic: Public finance
  subject:
    topic: Economics
  subject:
    topic: Public Economics
  classification: HJ9-9940
  classification: 336
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Springer eBooks
  identifier: 9783540748182
  identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74818-2
  record info:
    record creation date: 100301
    record change date: 20151204161359.0
    record identifier: 978-3-540-74818-2