rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Predictably Rational?
    sub title: In Search of Defenses for Rational Behavior in Economics
  name:
    name part: McKenzie, Richard B.
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  name:
    name part: SpringerLink (Online service)
  type of resource: text
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: gw
    date issued: 2010
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: electronic resource
    reformatting quality: access
    form: remote
    extent: XXII, 308 p. 1 illus. online resource.
  abstract: Mainstream economists everywhere exhibit an "irrational passion for dispassionate rationality." Behavioral economists, and long-time critic of mainstream economics suggests that people in mainstrean economic models "can think like Albert Einstein, store as much memory as IBM’s Big Blue, and exercise the will power of Mahatma Gandhi," with a view that economists’ view of homo sapiens is simply wrongheaded. Indeed, Thaler and other behavioral economists and psychology have documented a variety of ways in which real-world people fall far short of mainstream economists' idealized economic actor, perfectly rational homo economicus. Behavioral economist Daniel Ariely has concluded that real-world people not only exhibit an array of decision-making frailties and biases, they are "predictably irrational," a position now shared by so many behavioral economists, psychologists, sociologists, and evolutionary biologists that a defense of the core rationality premise of modedrn economics is demanded. In Predictably Rational? In Search of Defenses of Rational Behavior in Economics, Richard McKenzie, a professor of economics and management at the University of California, Irvine, takes up the challenge to defend mainstream economics’ core premise, but in unexpected ways. He first takes readers through a review of the intellectual history of the motivational premise undergirding economics from Adam Smith through to Alfred Marshall to Frank Knight, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek to Milton Friedman, George Stigler, and Gary becker. Professor McKenzie finds ample criticisms of the rationality premise within the intellectual history of the discipline. He also surveys the relevant literature in evolutionary biology and neurobiology and neujroeconomics, which fortifies the behavioralists’ criticisms that "perfect rationality" is not tenable. Nonetheless, in spite of the evidence and arguments, Professor Mckenzie mounts defenses of continued use of the rationality premise on counte…
  table of contents: Economists’ “Irrational Passion for Dispassionate Rationality” -- The Methodological Constraints on the Rationality Premise -- Human Motivation and Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hands” -- Rationality in Economic Thought: From Thomas Robert Malthus to Alfred Marshall and Philip Wicksteed -- Rationality in Economic Thought: Frank Knight, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and James Buchanan -- Behavioral Economists, and Psychologists’ Challenges to Rational Behavior -- The Evolutionary Biology of Rational Behavior -- The Neuroeconomics of Rational Decision Making -- Economic Defenses for Rational Behavior in Economics -- Problems with Behavioral Economics -- Rationality and Economic Education.
  note: by Richard B. McKenzie.
  subject:
    topic: Economics
  subject:
    topic: Management science
  subject:
    topic: Economic history
  subject:
    topic: Economic theory
  subject:
    topic: Economics
  subject:
    topic: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
  subject:
    topic: Economics, general
  subject:
    topic: Methodology/History of Economic Thought
  classification: HB1-846.8
  classification: 330.1
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Springer eBooks
  identifier: 9783642015861
  identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01586-1
  record info:
    record creation date: 100301
    record change date: 20151204170454.0
    record identifier: 978-3-642-01586-1