rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Algorithmic Game Theory
    sub title: Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings
  name:
    name part: Kontogiannis, Spyros.
    role:
      role term: editor.
  name:
    name part: Koutsoupias, Elias.
    role:
      role term: editor.
  name:
    name part: Spirakis, Paul G.
    role:
      role term: editor.
  name:
    name part: SpringerLink (Online service)
  type of resource: text
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: gw
    date issued: 2010
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: electronic resource
    reformatting quality: access
    form: remote
    extent: VIII, 359 p. 25 illus. online resource.
  table of contents: When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games.
  note: edited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul G. Spirakis.
  subject:
    topic: Computer science
  subject:
    topic: Computers
  subject:
    topic: Numerical analysis
  subject:
    topic: Computer simulation
  subject:
    topic: Computers and civilization
  subject:
    topic: E-commerce
  subject:
    topic: Computer Science
  subject:
    topic: Simulation and Modeling
  subject:
    topic: e-Commerce/e-business
  subject:
    topic: Theory of Computation
  subject:
    topic: Models and Principles
  subject:
    topic: Computers and Society
  subject:
    topic: Numeric Computing
  classification: QA76.9.C65
  classification: 003.3
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Springer eBooks
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6386
  identifier: 9783642161704
  identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4
  record info:
    record creation date: 101013
    record change date: 20170119211320.0
    record identifier: 978-3-642-16170-4