rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting
  name:
    name part: Schofield, Norman.
    role:
      role term: editor.
  name:
    name part: Caballero, Gonzalo.
    role:
      role term: editor.
  name:
    name part: SpringerLink (Online service)
  type of resource: text
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: gw
    date issued: 2011
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: electronic resource
    reformatting quality: access
    form: remote
    extent: IX, 425 p. online resource.
  abstract: This book presents the latest research in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The authors are eminent scholars from the U.S., Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, Mexico and the Philippines. Many of them have been influenced by Nobel laureate Douglass North, who pioneered the new institutional social sciences, or by William H. Riker who contributed to the field of positive political theory. The book focuses on topics such as: case studies in institutional analysis; research on war and the formation of states; the analysis of corruption; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods; comparing elections under plurality and proportional rule, and in developed and new democracies. .
  table of contents: Introduction -- Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? -- War, Wealth, and the Formation of States -- Why Do Weak States Prefer Prohibition to Taxation? -- Self-enforcing, Public-order Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Litigation, Regulation, and Limited Government in Venice, 1050 - 1350 -- Judicial Stability During Regime Change: Apex Courts in India 1937-1960 -- Institutional Arrangements Matter for Both Efficiency and Distribution: Contributions and Challenges of the New Institutional Economics -- Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain) -- Coalition Governments and Electoral Behavior: Who Is Accountable? -- Democracy and Voting: Empirical and Formal Models of the United States Presidential Elections in 2000 and 2004 -- Modelling Elections in Post-Communist Regimes: Voter Perceptions, Political Leaders and Activists -- Electoral Systems and Party Responsiveness -- Electoral Institutions and Political Corruption: Ballot Structure, Electoral Formula, and Graft -- A Model of Party Entry in Parliamentary Systems with Proportional Representation -- Moving in Time: Legislative Party Switching as Time-Contingent Choice -- On the Distribution of Particularistic Goods -- Vote Revelation: Empirical Content of Scoring Rules.
  note: edited by Norman Schofield, Gonzalo Caballero.
  subject:
    topic: Political science
  subject:
    topic: Economic theory
  subject:
    topic: Public finance
  subject:
    topic: Political Science and International Relations
  subject:
    topic: Political Science
  subject:
    topic: Public Economics
  subject:
    topic: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
  classification: JA1-92
  classification: 320
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Springer eBooks
  identifier: 9783642195198
  identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8
  record info:
    record creation date: 110610
    record change date: 20151204145204.0
    record identifier: 978-3-642-19519-8