Causation and laws of nature in early modern philosophy /

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Ott, Walter R. (συγγραφέας)
Μορφή: Βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2009.
Θέματα:
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
  • Introduction
  • Themes
  • The origin and status of laws of nature
  • The ontology of powers
  • Necessity
  • Models of causation
  • Plan of the book
  • The Aristotelian background
  • Necessity
  • The ontology of relations
  • Manifest and occult qualities
  • The Cartesian predicament
  • What mechanism isn't
  • The rejection of Aristotelianism
  • The nude wax : Cartesian ontology
  • The laws of nature
  • Force
  • Occasionalism
  • The concurrentist reading
  • The argument from laws of nature
  • Thoroughgoing occasionalism
  • The problem of mental causation
  • The dialectic of occasionalism
  • Malebranche and the cognitive model of causation
  • The argument from nonsense
  • The argument from elimination
  • The divine concursus argument
  • 'Little souls' revisited
  • The 'no necessary connection' argument
  • The epistemic argument
  • Laws and divine volitions
  • The content of divine volitions
  • The problem of efficacious laws
  • Causation and explanation
  • A scholastic mechanism
  • Régis against the occasionalists
  • Power and necessity
  • A dead cadaverous thing
  • Relations and powers
  • Boyle's paradox
  • Boyle and the concurrentists
  • Locke on relations
  • Locke on powers : the geometrical model
  • Locke's mechanisms
  • Hume
  • The two Humes
  • Intentionality
  • Meaning
  • Against the positivist reading
  • Signification
  • Judgment and belief
  • Semiotic empiricism
  • Relative ideas
  • The argument from nonsense
  • Necessity
  • Finding Hume's target
  • Against the cognitive and geometrical models
  • The neighboring fields
  • The practicality requirement
  • Relations
  • The status of relations
  • Two kinds of relations
  • The nature of necessity
  • The definition of causation
  • The problem
  • Subjectivism or projectivism?
  • Conclusion.