Judgment and agency /

"Ernest Sosa extends his distinctive approach to epistemology, intertwining issues concerning the role of the will in judgment and belief with issues of epistemic evaluation. Questions about skepticism and the nature of knowledge are at the forefront. The answers defended are new in their expli...

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Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Sosa, Ernest (συγγραφέας)
Μορφή: Βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2015.
Έκδοση:First edition.
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Contributor biographical information
Publisher description
Table of contents only
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020 |a 9780198719694 
020 |a 0198719698 
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100 1 |a Sosa, Ernest  |9 4162  |e συγγραφέας 
245 1 0 |a Judgment and agency /  |c Ernest Sosa. 
250 |a First edition. 
260 |a Oxford :  |b Oxford University Press,  |c 2015. 
300 |a vi, 269 σ ;  |c 25 εκ. 
504 |a Περιλαμβάνει βιβλιογραφία και ευρετήριο. 
505 0 0 |g Part I. Virtue epistemology extended and unified.  |t The unity of action, perception, and knowledge --  |t Virtue epistemology: character versus competence --  |g Part II. A better virtue epistemology.  |t Judgment and agency --  |t A better virtue epistemology further developed --  |t Objections and replies, with a methodological afterthought --  |g Part III. Knowledge and agency.  |t Knowledge and action --  |t Intentional action and judgment --  |t Social roots of human knowledge --  |t Epistemic agency --  |g Part IV. Main historical antecedents.  |t Pyrrhonian skepticism and human agency --  |t Descartes's Pyrrhonian virtue epistemology. 
520 |a "Ernest Sosa extends his distinctive approach to epistemology, intertwining issues concerning the role of the will in judgment and belief with issues of epistemic evaluation. Questions about skepticism and the nature of knowledge are at the forefront. The answers defended are new in their explicit and sustained focus on judgment and epistemic agency. While noting that human knowledge trades on distinctive psychological capacities, Sosa also emphasizes the role of the social in human knowledge. Basic animal knowledge is supplemented by a level of reflective knowledge focused on judgment, and a level of 'knowing full well' that is distinctive of the animal that is rational"-- 
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856 4 2 |3 Contributor biographical information  |u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1604/2014957468-b.html 
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