| Περίληψη: | "This volume assembles nine of the author's essays on determinism, freedom and moral responsibility in Western antiquity, ranging from Aristotle via Epicureans and Stoics to the 3rd century. It is representative of the author's overall scholarship on the topic, much of which is devoted to showing that what commonly counts as 'the problem of free-will and determinism' is noticeably distinct from the issues the ancients discussed. It is true that one main component of the ancient discourse concerned the question how moral accountability can be consistently combined with certain causal factors that impact human behaviour. However, it is not true that the ancient problems involved the questions of the compatibility of causal determinism with our ability to do otherwise or with free will. Instead, we encounter questions about human rational and autonomous agency and their compatibility with preceding causes, external or internal; with external impediments; with divine predetermination and theological questions; with physical theories like atomism and continuum theory, and with sciences more generally; with elements that determine character development from childhood, such as nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with necessity and modal theories generally; with folk theories of fatalism; and also with questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, to blame and praise. These questions were all debated without reference to freedom to do otherwise or free-will-at least in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy. This volume considers all of these questions to some extent"-- Provided by publisher.
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