Mixed signals : how incentives really work /

Incentives send powerful signals that aim to influence behavior. But often there is a conflict between what we say and what we do in response to these incentives. The result: mixed signals. Consider the CEO who urges teamwork but designs incentives for individual success, who invites innovation bu...

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Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Gneezy, Uri (συγγραφέας.)
Μορφή: Βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: New Haven ; London : Yale University Press, 2923.
Θέματα:
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245 1 0 |a Mixed signals :  |b how incentives really work /  |c Uri Gneezy. 
260 |a New Haven ;   |a London :   |b Yale University Press,  |c 2923. 
300 |a ix, 307 σ. :  |b εικ. ;  |c 25 εκ. 
504 |a Περιλαμβάνει βιβλιογραφικές παραπομπές και ευρετήριο. 
505 0 |a Introduction : Do as I say, not as I do -- How signaling wins markets. Credible signals -- How Toyota won the hybrid car market -- It's just who I am : the value of self-signaling -- Avoid mixed signals. When more is less : incentivizing quantity at the expense of quality -- Encouraging innovation but punishing failure -- Encouraging long-term goals but rewarding short-term results -- Encouraging teamwork but incentivizing individual success -- How incentives shape the story. Stakes and mistakes -- Mental accounting : choosing the incentive's currency -- Regret as incentives -- Prosocial incentives -- Awards as signals -- Use incentives to identify the problem. Are US students really so bad? -- Overhead aversion : how nonprofits get a bad rap -- "Pay to quit" strategy : making employees put their money where their mouth is -- Bribing the self : cheating and self-signaling -- How incentives lead to behavior change. Creating habits : change happens one step at a time ... literally -- Breaking habits : kicking bad behaviors ot the curb -- I want it now! -- Removing barriers -- Helping communities change harmful cultural practices. From lion killers to lion savers : changing the story -- Insurance fraud and moral hazard : the Maasai edition -- Changing the warriors' story -- Changing the economics of female genital mutilation -- Negotiate your signals : putting incentives to work at the negotiation table. Anchoring and adjustment -- The contrast effect -- Price signals quality -- The norm of reciprocity -- Conclusion : From mixed signals to clear signals. 
520 |a Incentives send powerful signals that aim to influence behavior. But often there is a conflict between what we say and what we do in response to these incentives. The result: mixed signals. Consider the CEO who urges teamwork but designs incentives for individual success, who invites innovation but punishes failure, who emphasizes quality but pays for quantity. Employing real-world scenarios just like this to illustrate this everyday phenomenon, behavioral economist Uri Gneezy explains why incentives often fail and demonstrates how the right incentives can change behavior by aligning with signals for better results. Drawing on behavioral economics, game theory, psychology, and fieldwork, Gneezy outlines how to be incentive smart, designing rewards that are simple and effective. He highlights how the right combination of economic and psychological incentives can encourage people to drive more fuel-efficient cars, be more innovative at work, and even get to the gym. Incentives send a signal, Gneezy writes, and your objective is to make sure this signal is aligned with your goals.--Provided by publisher. 
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