Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach /

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Houba, Harold (Συγγραφέας), Bolt, Wilko (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Boston, MA : Springer US, 2002.
• Σειρά: Theory and Decision Library, Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research, 32
• Θέματα: Economic theory.; Microeconomics.; Macroeconomics.; Labor economics.; Environmental economics.; Economics.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics.; Labor Economics.; Environmental Economics.

The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with a...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• The Essence of Negotiation
• Exogenous disagreement outcomes
• The Alternating Offers Procedure
• The Nash Program
• Comprehensive Bargaining Problems
• Comparative Statics
• A Bargaining Model with Threats
• Endogenous Threats
• Commitment and Endogenous Threats
• Bargaining over Wages
• The Policy Bargaining Model
• Destructive Threats.