The Encyclopedia of Public Choice
The Encyclopedia provides a detailed and comprehensive account of the subject known as public choice. However, the title would not convey suf- ciently the breadth of the Encyclopedia’s contents which can be summarized better as the fruitful interchange of economics, political science and moral philo...
| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
|---|---|
| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | , |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Boston, MA :
Springer US,
2004.
|
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Essays
- Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy
- Public Choice: An Introduction
- Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct?
- Constitutional Political Economy
- Corruption
- Dictatorship
- Environmental Politics
- Experimental Public Choice
- Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation
- Interest Group Behavior and Influence
- International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade
- James M. Buchanan
- Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution
- Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior
- The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters
- Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics
- Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought
- Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law
- Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy
- Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology
- Public Finance
- Regulation and Antitrust
- Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson
- Shadow Economy
- Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling
- Spatial Theory
- Trade Liberalization and Globalization
- William H. Riker
- Concepts
- Academia
- Al-Qaeda
- Alternative Voting Methods
- Altruism
- The Anatomy of Political Representation
- Approval Voting
- Arbitration and Bargaining
- Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
- An ‘Austrian’ Perspective on Public Choice
- Autocracy
- Autocratic Succession
- Bicameralism
- Blackmail
- Black’s Single-Peakedness Condition
- Budgetary Processes
- Budget Deficits
- Bureaucratic Discretion
- Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance
- Campaign Finance 1
- Campaign Finance 2
- Central Banks
- Chicago Political Economy
- The Clayton Act
- Coalitions and Power Indices
- Coalitions and Social Choice
- Coase Theorem and Political Markets
- Coercion
- Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation
- Committee Assignments
- Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions
- Committees in Legislatures
- Commons and Anticommons
- Constitution
- Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress
- The Constitution of the European Union
- Constitutional Political Economy
- The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy
- Contractarianism
- Corruption 1
- Corruption 2
- Cost and Choice
- The Cost Disease of the Personal Services
- Customary Law
- The Demand-Revealing Process
- Deregulation of Postal Service
- Dictators and Social Contracts
- Direct Democracy
- Discrimination
- Dynamic Inconsistency
- Economic Freedom and its Measurement
- Economic Freedom and Political Freedom
- Economic Regulation
- The Economic Theory of Clubs
- Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy
- Education and the State
- Efficiency of Democracy
- Efficiency of Democracy?
- The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis
- Elected Versus Appointed Regulators
- Election Models
- Electoral College
- Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation
- The Elusive Median Voter
- Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle
- Endogenous Morality
- Enron
- Environmental Politics and Economic Development
- The Euro
- European Political Integration
- Evolution of Institutions
- The Evolution of Law
- Experimental Economics and Public Choice
- Experimental Public Choice
- Expressive Voting and Redistribution
- Fair Division
- Fame and Politics
- Federal Reserve System
- Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States
- Game Theory
- Game Theory in Public Choice
- Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making
- Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition
- Growth of Local Government in the United States
- The Growth of Public Expenditure
- The Growth of the Relative Size of Government
- Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution
- Homo Economicus
- Human Evolution and Political Behavior
- Ideology
- The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics
- Initiative and Referendum
- Institutions of Trade Protection
- Interest Groups 1
- Interest Groups 2
- International Game of Power
- International Organization
- Internet Voting
- Is Russia a Market Economy?
- Is Voting Rational?
- The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice
- The Judiciary
- The Law and Economics Movement
- Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion
- Legal Rules and Standards
- Legislative Politics
- Legislators
- Leviathan Models of Government
- Logic of Collective Action
- The Logic of Liberty
- Logrolling 1
- Logrolling 2
- Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown
- The Median in Politics
- The Median Voter Model
- Medieval Church
- Mercantilism
- Monetary Politics
- The New Deal
- Nonprofit Organizations
- The Origins of Social Choice Theory
- The Paradox of Rebellion
- Parchment Versus Guns
- Political and Cultural Nationalism
- Political Business Cycles
- Political Economics and Public Choice
- The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments
- The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform
- Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation
- Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters
- Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of Bureaucracy
- Prohibition
- Public Choice and Socialism
- Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust
- Public Choice in Italy
- Public Enterprise
- Public Finance and the Median Voter Model
- Public Finance in Democratic Process
- Public Goods
- Public Schools
- Public Utility Regulation
- Rational Choice Approaches to Economic and Political History
- Rational Ignorance
- Rational Irrationality
- Reciprocity
- Redistributive Politics 1
- Redistributive Politics 2
- Regulating Government
- Regulatory Takings
- Rent Dissipation
- Rent Extraction
- Rent Seeking
- Rent Seeking and Political Institutions
- Rent-Seeking Games
- Rent Seeking in Development
- The Rule of Law
- Rules Versus Standards
- Self-Interest
- Selfish Gene
- September 11, 2001
- Single-Peaked Preferences and Median Voter Theorems
- The Social Cost of Rent Seeking
- Sortition
- Standard Oil and Microsoft: Antitrust Lessons
- State-Sponsored Murder as a Rent-Seeking Activity
- Structure-Induced Equilibrium
- Supply of Public Goods
- The Supreme Court
- Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price
- Term Limits 1
- Term Limits 2
- Terrorism
- The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom
- Totalitarianism
- Trade Protectionism
- Transitional Economies
- Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy
- Triangulation
- Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector
- The Value of Voting Rights
- Votes for Women
- Voting Equipment, Minorities and the Poor
- Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections
- Voting Paradoxes in List Systems of Proportional Representation
- The War on Drugs
- Welfare Economics and Public Choice
- Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State
- Why Government Succeeds.
