Preferences and Procedures European Union Legislative Decision-Making /

Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comp...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Selck, Torsten J. (Επιμελητής έκδοσης)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Boston, MA : Springer US, 2006.
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
Περιγραφή
Περίληψη:Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.
Φυσική περιγραφή:X, 99 p. online resource.
ISBN:9780387275543