Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski

• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Antle, Rick (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Gjesdal, Frøystein (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Liang, Pierre Jinghong (Επιμελητής έκδοσης)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: New York, NY : Springer New York, 2007.
• Θέματα: Business.; Accounting.; Bookkeeping.; Business and Management.; Accounting/Auditing.

 Rick Antle is the William S. Beinecke Professor of Accounting at the Yale School of Management, where he was the Senior Associate Dean from 2000 to 2005. Frøystein Gjesdal is a professor of Managerial Economics at Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) and is currently Head of the Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law. Pierre Jinghong Liang is an Associate Professor of Accounting at Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University. Advancing understanding of accounting theory, this rigorous scholarly work focuses on the analysis of corporate accounting reports as a source of information used in corporate decision-making and in pricing securities by the capital market. Wide-ranging and important chapters cover such topical issues as: managerial compensation, corporate insider trading, real options, fair value accounting standards, procurement costing, and quantum information. The chapters illustrate the variety of both modeling and empirical methods for addressing issues involving incentives and information. The authors' unparalleled quality makes this book useful for both established and aspiring accounting scholars. . 

 Joel S. Demski: A Leader in Accounting Scholarship -- Joel S. Demski: A Leader in Accounting Scholarship -- General Theory -- Fair Value, Accounting Aggregation and Multiple Sources of Information -- Equilibrium Voluntary Disclosures when Firms Possess Random Multi-Dimensional Private Information -- Synergy, Quantum Probabilities, and Cost of Control -- Moral Hazard with Hidden Information -- On The Subtleties of the Principal-Agent Model -- Applied Theory -- Incentive Problems and Investment Timing Options -- Aligning Incentives by Capping Bonuses -- The Controllability Principle in Responsibility Accounting: Another Look -- Public Disclosure of Trades by Corporate Insiders in Financial Markets and Tacit Coordination -- Connections to Practice -- The Structure of Performance-Vested Stock Option Grants -- The Lcamr Missile -- Commentary and Perspectives -- A Note on the Information Perspective and the Conceptual Framework -- Economizing Principle in Accounting Research.