Approval Voting

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Brams, Steven J. (Συγγραφέας), Fishburn, Peter C. (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: New York, NY : Springer New York, 2007.
• Έκδοση: Second Edition.
• Θέματα: Mathematics.; Political science.; Economic theory.; Public finance.; Mathematics, general.; Public Economics.; Political Science.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.

Approval Voting proposes a compelling way to elect some 500,000 officials in public elections. Under this system voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candid...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution
• Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?
• The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?
• The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules
• Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?
• Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data
• Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
• Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions
• Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election
• Epilogue.