Democratic Governance and Economic Performance How Accountability Can Go Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business /
Conventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. But logically extending this wisdom implies that associated principals – voters, consumers, shareholders – will favor themselves over the greater good when ‘rules of the game’ instead...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | Falaschetti, Dino (Συγγραφέας) |
|---|---|
| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | SpringerLink (Online service) |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
New York, NY :
Springer New York,
2009.
|
| Σειρά: | Studies in Public Choice,
14 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
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