Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences Does Representation Need Reality? /

• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Riegler, Alexander (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Peschl, Markus (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Stein, Astrid von (Επιμελητής έκδοσης)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Boston, MA : Springer US, 1999.
• Θέματα: Medicine.; Philosophy.; Epistemology.; Phenomenology.; Neurology.; Artificial intelligence.; Cognitive psychology.; Medicine & Public Health.; Cognitive Psychology.; Philosophy, general.; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics).

 urrently a paradigm shift is occurring in for the conventional understanding of represen- which the traditional view of the brain as tions. The paper also summarizes the rationale for C representing the "things of the world" is the selection of contributions to this volume, which challenged in several respects. The present volume will roughly proceed from relatively "realist" c- is placed at the edge of this transition. Based on the ceptions of representation to more "constructivist" 1997 conference "New Trends in Cognitive Sci- interpretations. The final chapter of discussions, ence" in Vienna, Austria, it tries to collect and in- taped during and at the end of the conference, p- grate evidence from various disciplines such as p- vides the reader with the possibility to reflect upon losophy of science, neuroscience, computational the different approaches and thus contributes to b- approaches, psychology, semiotics, evolutionary ter and more integrative understanding of their biology, social psychology etc. , to foster a new thoughts and ideas. understanding of representation. The subjective experience of an outside world This book has a truly interdisciplinary character. It seems to suggest a mapping process where environ- is presented in a form that is readily accessible to mental entities are projected into our mind via some professionals and students alike across the cognitive kind of transmission. While a profound critique of sciences such as neuroscience, computer science, this idea is nearly as old as philosophy, it has gained philosophy, psychology, and sociology. 

 Position Paper -- Does Representation Need Reality? -- Overview of Contributions -- Different Facets of Representation -- The Connectionist Route to Embodiment and Dynamicism -- The Ontological Status of Representations -- Empirical and Metaphysical Anti-Representationalism -- Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience -- Cognition without Representation? -- Computational Approaches -- On Computing Systems and Their Environment -- Representation and Cognitive Explanation -- When Coffee Cups Are Like Old Elephants, or Why Representation Modules Don’t Make Sense -- The Recommendation Architecture: Relating Cognition to Physiology -- Cognition as a Dynamical System -- Neurodynamics and the Revival of Associationism in Cognitive Science -- The Dynamic Manifestation of Cognitive Structures in the Cerebral Cortex -- Response Selectivity, Neuron Doctrine, and Mach’s Principle in Perception -- Mental Representations: A Computational-Neuroscience Scheme -- Relevance of Action for Representation -- Sketchpads In and Beyond the Brain -- Inductive Learning with External Representations -- Does the Brain Represent the World? Evidence Against the Mapping Assumption -- Perception Through Anticipation. A Behaviour-Based Approach to Visual Perception -- Symbol Grounding nad Language -- Rethinking Grounding -- Reality: A Prerequisite to Meaningful Representation -- Explorations in Synthetic Pragmatics -- Communication and Social Coupling -- Does Semantics Need Reality? -- Empiricism and Social Reality: Can Cognitive Science Be Socialized? -- Habitus and Animats -- Processing Concepts and Scenarios: Electrophysiological Findings on Language Representation -- Constructivist Consequences: Translation and Reality -- Qualitative Aspects of Representation and Consciousness -- The Observer in the Brain -- Reality and Representation Qualia, Computers, and the “Explanatory Gap” -- Constructivism -- Can a Constructivist Distinguish between Experience and Representation? -- How Animals Handle Reality- The Adaptive Aspect of Representation -- Piaget’s Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity.