Action and Responsibility
What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls &...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Dordrecht :
Springer Netherlands,
2006.
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Σειρά: | Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy,
18 |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Two Questions
- Ascriptivism Resurrected: The Case for Ascriptivism
- Ascriptivism Defended: The Case Against Ascriptivism
- Responsibility and Causation I: Legal Responsibility
- Responsibility and Causation II: Moral Responsibility
- Foundationalism and the Production Question
- Foundationalism and the Status Question: Strong Productionism
- Nouveau Volitionism
- Weak Productionism
- Concluding Reflections on Ascriptivism and Action.