Nonbayesian Decision Theory Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action /
This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Dordrecht :
Springer Netherlands,
2008.
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Σειρά: | Theory and Decision Library ;
44 |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Bayesian decision theory
- Choosing what to decide
- Indeterminate preferences
- Utility
- Subjective probability
- Expected utility
- Risk aversion.