An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism Defending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation /

This monograph develops a new way of justifying the claims made by science about phenomenon not directly observable by humans, such as atoms and black holes. It details a way of making inferences to the existence and properties of unobservable entities and states of affairs that can be given a proba...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Wright, John (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2018.
Έκδοση:1st ed. 2018.
Σειρά:Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science ; 402
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
  • Chapter 1. Introduction: Realism and Reason
  • Chapter 2. The Skeptical Arguments Against Realism- 1: Inductive Skepticism
  • Chapter 3. The Skeptical Arguments - 2: The Pessimistic Meta-Induction
  • Chapter 4. Realism and Inference to the Best Explanation
  • Chapter 5. On the Inference to Unobservables
  • Chapter 6. Underdetermination and Theory Preference
  • Chapter 7. Eddington Inferences in Science - 1: Atoms and Molecules
  • Chapter 8. Eddington Inferences in Science - 2: The Size and Shape of the Universe
  • Bibliography.