James M. Buchanan A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy /
"A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan's many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory." - Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA "The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this ve...
| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
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| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Cham :
Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan,
2018.
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| Έκδοση: | 1st ed. 2018. |
| Σειρά: | Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists,
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| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- 1. Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant?- Richard E. Wagner
- Part I: Subjectivism and the Methodology of Political Economy
- 2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden
- 3. Duke, Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan- Michael Munger
- 4. Brown, James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason and Rosolino Candela
- 5. James Buchanan and the "New Economics of Order" Research Program- Stefan Kolev
- 6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan's Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason and Richard E. Wagner
- Part II: Public Finance and the Theory of the State
- 7. The Conflict between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White
- 8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart and David Ehmke
- 9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert
- 10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly
- 11. Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones
- 12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne and Thomas K. Duncan
- 13. Contraception without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Gustavus Adolphus
- 14. Samaritan's Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. Wagner
- Part III: Collective Action and Constitutional Political Economy
- 15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality- Dennis Mueller
- 16. Constitutional, Political, and Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin
- 17. Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan
- 18. Blockchains as Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts
- 19. The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a "Nobel" Lie- J.R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee.-20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson
- 21. Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke
- 22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg
- 23. On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas
- 24. Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin and James Ruhland
- Part IV: Ethics, Social Philosophy, and Liberal Political Economy
- 25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg
- 26. A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan's Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe
- 27. Buchanan's Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto
- 28. Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg
- 29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton and Alexander W. Salter
- 30. Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux
- 31. James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals- David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart
- 32. From Highways to Clubs: On Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods- Alain Marciano
- Part V: Economic Theory as Social Theory
- 33. In Defence of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus
- 34. Toward a Rule-based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton
- 35. The Constitution of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
- 36. The Extent of the Market and Ethics- Yong Yoon
- 37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government- Andrew T. Young
- 38. Rules vs. Discretion in Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D'Amico
- 39. Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist- Solomon Stein
- 40. From Models to Experiments: James Buchanan and Charles Plott- Gil Hersch and Daniel Houser
- Part VI: Money, Debt, and the Rule of Law
- 41. Rules Versus Authorities: Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson
- 42. The Quest for Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld
- 43. The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi
- 44. Can there be such a thing as Legitimate Public Debt in a Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi
- 45. Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas Zelmanovitz
- Part VII: Buchanan in Relation to Other Prominent Scholars
- 46. Italian Influences on Buchanan's Research Program- Alain Marciano and Manuela Mosca
- 47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael McLure
- 48. Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica
- 49. The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic- Robert Bish
- 50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight's Picture on the Wall despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics- Ross Emmett.
