Themes from Klein Knowledge, Scepticism, and Justification /

• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Fitelson, Branden (Επιμελητής έκδοσης, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt), Borges, Rodrigo (Επιμελητής έκδοσης, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt), Braden, Cherie (Επιμελητής έκδοσης, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2019.
• Σειρά: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science ; 404
• Θέματα: Epistemology.; Sociology.; France-History.; Philosophy.; Philosophy, Ancient.; Knowledge - Discourse.; History of France.; Popular Science in Philosophy.; Classical Philosophy.

 This volume features more than fifteen essays written in honor of Peter D. Klein. It explores the work and legacy of this prominent philosopher, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein's work. They engage directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors. In addition, a comprehensive introduction discusses the overall impact of Klein's philosophical work. It also explains how each of the essays in the book fits within that legacy. Coverage includes such topics as a knowledge-first account of defeasible reasoning, felicitous falsehoods, the possibility of foundationalist justification, the many formal faces of defeat, radical scepticism, and more. Overall, the book provides readers with an overview of Klein's contributions to epistemology, his importance to twentieth and twenty-first-century philosophy, and a survey of his philosophical ideas and accomplishments. It's not only a celebration of the work of an important philosopher. It also offers readers an insightful journey into the nature of knowledge, scepticism, and justification. 

 Part I: Knowledge -- Chapter 1. Reflective Knowledge (Ernest Sosa) -- Chapter 2. Epistemically Useful Falsehoods (Catherine Z. Elgin) -- Chapter 3. Theoretical Unity in Epistemology (Jonathan L. Kvanvig) -- Chapter 4. Accurate Enough, Comprehensive Enough, and Reasonable Enough Belief (Richard Foley) -- Chapter 5. Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary (Rodrigo Borges) -- Chapter 6. A Causal Aspect of Epistemic Basing (Robert K. Shope) -- Part II: Scepticism -- Chapter 7. The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism (Linda Zagzebski) -- Chapter 8. Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism (Sharon Ryan) -- Chapter 9. Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination (Claudio de Almeida) -- Part III: Justification -- Chapter 10. Finite Minds (Michael Huemer) -- Chapter 11. Finite Minds and Open Minds (Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson) -- Chapter 12. Some Notes on the Possibility of Foundationalist Justification (Sanford C. Goldberg) -- Chapter 13. A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat (Matthew Kotzen) -- Chapter 14: Benign Infinity (Matthias Steup).