Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes /

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Felsenthal, Dan S. (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut), Nurmi, Hannu (http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2019.
• Σειρά: SpringerBriefs in Economics,
• Θέματα: Welfare economics.; Elections.; Political philosophy.; Economic theory.; Democracy.; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy.; Electoral Politics.; Political Philosophy.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
• Φυσική περιγραφή: X, 92 p. online resource.
• ISBN: 9783030126278
• ISSN: 2191-5504
• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8

This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of voting procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.