Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes /

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Felsenthal, Dan S. (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut), Nurmi, Hannu (http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2019.
• Σειρά: SpringerBriefs in Economics,
• Θέματα: Welfare economics.; Elections.; Political philosophy.; Economic theory.; Democracy.; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy.; Electoral Politics.; Political Philosophy.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.

This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the in...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• Introduction
• 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
• The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain
• The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain
• The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain
• Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?
• The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain
• Summary.