Modest Nonconceptualism Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content /
The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism,...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Cham :
Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer,
2015.
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| Σειρά: | Studies in Brain and Mind ;
8 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Content, Concepts, Concept Possession
- 3 Nonconceptual Content
- 4 Arguments from Phenomenology
- 5 The Argument from Contradictory Contents
- 6 Arguments from Concept Possession
- 7 The Epistemological Objection
- 8 The Objection from Objectivity
- 9 Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated.
