Fair Queueing

This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Chun, Youngsub (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2016.
Σειρά:Studies in Choice and Welfare,
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
LEADER 02531nam a22005055i 4500
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020 |a 9783319337715  |9 978-3-319-33771-5 
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100 1 |a Chun, Youngsub.  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Fair Queueing  |h [electronic resource] /  |c by Youngsub Chun. 
264 1 |a Cham :  |b Springer International Publishing :  |b Imprint: Springer,  |c 2016. 
300 |a XI, 157 p. 1 illus.  |b online resource. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
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490 1 |a Studies in Choice and Welfare,  |x 1614-0311 
505 0 |a Introduction -- Basic Concepts -- Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach -- Independence, Monotonicity, and Balanced Consistency -- No-envy -- Startegyproofness -- Strategyproofness and Egalitarian Equivalence -- Subgroup Additivity -- A Non-Cooperative Approach -- Queueing Problems with Two. 
520 |a This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The problem is to find the order in which to serve agents and monetary transfers they should receive. The queueing problem has been studied extensively in the recent literature. 
650 0 |a Operations research. 
650 0 |a Decision making. 
650 0 |a Game theory. 
650 0 |a Management science. 
650 0 |a Economic theory. 
650 1 4 |a Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. 
650 2 4 |a Operation Research/Decision Theory. 
650 2 4 |a Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. 
650 2 4 |a Operations Research, Management Science. 
710 2 |a SpringerLink (Online service) 
773 0 |t Springer eBooks 
776 0 8 |i Printed edition:  |z 9783319337708 
830 0 |a Studies in Choice and Welfare,  |x 1614-0311 
856 4 0 |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5  |z Full Text via HEAL-Link 
912 |a ZDB-2-ECF 
950 |a Economics and Finance (Springer-41170)