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03175nam a22004575i 4500 |
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|a 9783319508924
|9 978-3-319-50892-4
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|a 10.1007/978-3-319-50892-4
|2 doi
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|a 330.12
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|a Arsenault, Matthew P.
|e author.
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|a The Effects of Political Institutions on Varieties of Capitalism
|h [electronic resource] /
|c by Matthew P. Arsenault.
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|a Cham :
|b Springer International Publishing :
|b Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan,
|c 2017.
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|a XI, 204 p. 13 illus., 9 illus. in color.
|b online resource.
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|a text
|b txt
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|a 1. Political Institutions and Varieties of Capitalism -- 2. A Political Approach to Explaining Variation in Capitalist Systems -- 3. A Mixed-Method Approach to Capitalist Variation -- 4. A Quantitative Analysis of Varieties of Capitalism -- 5. Political Institutions and Economic Reforms: Britain and Germany -- 6. The Economic Effects of Electoral Reform: New Zealand -- 7. Conclusion.
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|a This book identifies and explores the mechanisms linking political institutions and variation in capitalist systems. A strong correlation exists between varieties of political regimes and varieties of capitalism: majoritarian political regimes are correlated with liberal market economies (LMEs) and consensus political regimes are correlated with coordinated market economies (CMEs). Still, correlation is not causation. Empirical findings illustrate that partisanship and policy legacies, the number of political parties, electoral rules, and constitutional constraints are significant indicators of LMEs and CMEs. Arsenault finds that majoritarian institutions create an environment of adversarial politics and strong competition between actors, which makes credible commitment to nonmarket coordination mechanisms unlikely. Consensus institutions, on the other hand, promote an atmosphere of cooperation and coordination between actors, thus encouraging credible commitment to nonmarket coordination mechanisms. Qualitative case studies of Germany, Britain, and New Zealand confirm the quantitative findings and suggest that political regimes were instrumental in shaping the economic adjustment paths of these countries during the era of liberalization in the 1980s.
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|a Political economy.
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|a Public finance.
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|a Economics.
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|a Economics.
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|a Economic Systems.
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|a Public Economics.
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|a Political Economy.
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|a SpringerLink (Online service)
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|t Springer eBooks
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|i Printed edition:
|z 9783319508917
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|u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50892-4
|z Full Text via HEAL-Link
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|a ZDB-2-ECF
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|a Economics and Finance (Springer-41170)
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