Economic Analysis of Contract Law Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information /

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Bag, Sugata (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2018.
• Θέματα: Law and economics.; Public finance.; Commercial law.; Law and Economics.; Public Economics.; Business Law.
• Φυσική περιγραφή: XVI, 203 p. 2 illus. in color. online resource.
• ISBN: 9783319652689
• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9

This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim's expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.