Economic Analysis of Contract Law Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information /

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Bag, Sugata (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2018.
• Θέματα: Law and economics.; Public finance.; Commercial law.; Law and Economics.; Public Economics.; Business Law.

This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Basics of Economic Theory of Contract
• 3. Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry
• 4. Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry
• 5. Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives Under Expectation Damage With One-Sided Private Information -A Mechanism Design Approach
• 6. Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information
• 7. Concluding Notes.