Beyond the Turnout Paradox The Political Economy of Electoral Participation /
This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox-the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election-is an o...
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| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Cham :
Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer,
2018.
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| Έκδοση: | 1st ed. 2018. |
| Σειρά: | SpringerBriefs in Political Science,
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| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Chapter 1: Beyond the Voter's Paradox
- Chapter 2: A General Model of Strategic Voting
- Chapter 3: The Stability Analysis of Voting Games
- Chapter 4: Electoral Participation Bias and the Welfare State
- Chapter 5: Toward a Structural Theory of Turnout.