Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Felsenthal, Dan S. (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut), Nurmi, Hannu (http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2018.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2018.
• Σειρά: SpringerBriefs in Economics,
• Θέματα: Welfare economics.; Elections.; Political philosophy.; Economic theory.; Democracy.; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy.; Electoral Politics.; Political Philosophy.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
• Φυσική περιγραφή: XV, 134 p. online resource.
• ISBN: 9783319740331
• ISSN: 2191-5504
• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.