Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Felsenthal, Dan S. (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut), Nurmi, Hannu (http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2018.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2018.
• Σειρά: SpringerBriefs in Economics,
• Θέματα: Welfare economics.; Elections.; Political philosophy.; Economic theory.; Democracy.; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy.; Electoral Politics.; Political Philosophy.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting P...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• Introduction
• Voting Paradoxes
• Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
• The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes
• The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes
• The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes
• Summary.