Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Zhang, Laobing (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut), Reniers, Genserik (http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2018.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2018.
• Σειρά: Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
• Θέματα: Game theory.; System safety.; Chemical engineering.; Operations research.; Decision making.; Mathematical models.; Game Theory.; Security Science and Technology.; Industrial Chemistry/Chemical Engineering.; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.; Operations Research/Decision Theory.; Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics.

 This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries. The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic adversaries. However, there is a lack of such advanced models to be employed by chemical security managers. In this book, game theoretic models for protecting chemical plants as well as clusters are proposed. Different equilibrium concepts are explored, with user-friendly explanation of how to reflect them to realistic cases. Based on efficient analysis of the properties of security issues in chemical plants/clusters, models in this book are capable to support resources allocations, cost-effectiveness analysis, cooperation incentives and alike. 

 Introduction -- 1. Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: the State of the Art -- 2. Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory -- 3. Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection -- 4. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-free Uncertainties -- 5. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality -- 6. Multi-Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Clusters Patrolling -- 7. Case Studies. 8. Conclusions and Recommendations. .