Agency Theory and Executive Pay The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma /

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Pepper, Alexander (Συγγραφέας, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Palgrave Pivot, 2019.
• Έκδοση: 1st ed. 2019.
• Θέματα: Corporate governance.; Personnel management.; Organization.; Planning.; Behavioral sciences.; Corporate Governance.; Human Resource Management.; Behavioral Sciences.

This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociol...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• 1. Agency Costs, Coordination Problems and the Remuneration Committee's Dilemma
• 2. What's Wrong with Agency Theory?
• 3. What a Public Corporation Really Is
• 4. Executive Pay as a Collective Action Problem
• 5. Behavioural Agency Theory
• 6. The Modern Corporation's Final Chapter.