Designing Democracy Ideas for Better Rules /

While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Gersbach, Hans (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
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100 1 |a Gersbach, Hans.  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Designing Democracy  |h [electronic resource] :  |b Ideas for Better Rules /  |c by Hans Gersbach. 
264 1 |a Berlin, Heidelberg :  |b Springer Berlin Heidelberg,  |c 2005. 
300 |a XI, 244 p.  |b online resource. 
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505 0 |a Incentive Contracts and Elections -- Overview -- Unobservability and Short-Termism in Long-Term Policies -- Short-Termism and Competition for Incentive Contracts -- Reelection Thresholds -- Effort Incentives and Monetary Rewards -- Limits to Incentive Contracts in Politics -- Rules for Decision-Making and Agenda Setting -- Overiview -- Examples for Agenda Rules -- Flexible Majority Rules -- Democratic Mechanisms -- Fair Division. 
520 |a While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have yet to experience an alternative. In this book the vision we propose is that the potential of democ­ racies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should be committed to. We present a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to im­ prove the functioning of democracies. The book falls into two parts. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. We suggest that a judicious combina­ tion of these two elements as a dual mechanism can alleviate a wide range of political failures, while at the same time adhering to the founding principles of democracies. The second part presents new rules for decision-making and agenda setting. Together with modern communication devices, these rules can sometimes transcend the limitations of liberal VI Preface democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. Examples of such rules include the flexible majority rule where the size of the ma­ jority required depends on the proposal, or the rule that only those belonging to the winning majority can be taxed. 
650 0 |a Political science. 
650 0 |a Economic theory. 
650 0 |a Public finance. 
650 0 |a Economic policy. 
650 0 |a Law and economics. 
650 1 4 |a Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Public Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. 
650 2 4 |a Political Science. 
650 2 4 |a Economic Policy. 
650 2 4 |a Law and Economics. 
710 2 |a SpringerLink (Online service) 
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776 0 8 |i Printed edition:  |z 9783540224020 
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950 |a Business and Economics (Springer-11643)