Designing Democracy Ideas for Better Rules /

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Gersbach, Hans (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.
• Θέματα: Political science.; Economic theory.; Public finance.; Economic policy.; Law and economics.; Economics.; Public Economics.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.; Political Science.; Economic Policy.; Law and Economics.

While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• Incentive Contracts and Elections
• Overview
• Unobservability and Short-Termism in Long-Term Policies
• Short-Termism and Competition for Incentive Contracts
• Reelection Thresholds
• Effort Incentives and Monetary Rewards
• Limits to Incentive Contracts in Politics
• Rules for Decision-Making and Agenda Setting
• Overiview
• Examples for Agenda Rules
• Flexible Majority Rules
• Democratic Mechanisms
• Fair Division.