Differential Information Economies
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative eq...
| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
|---|---|
| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | , |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2005.
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| Σειρά: | Studies in Economic Theory,
19 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
- Core Notions, Existence Results
- Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy
- Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper
- The core of an economy with differential information
- An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core
- On the continuity of expected utility
- Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core
- A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw
- Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information
- Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence
- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
- Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core
- Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
- Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core
- Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm
- Optimal multilateral contracts
- Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry
- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
- Incentive compatible contractible information
- Continuity and Stability
- Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete
- On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms
- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
- Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core
- Value Allocations and the Bargaining SET
- Cooperative games with incomplete information
- The value allocation of an economy with differential information
- Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information
- The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information
- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?
- Implementation
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
- An extensive form interpretation of the private core
- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies.
