Differential Information Economies
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative eq...
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
---|---|
Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | , |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2005.
|
Σειρά: | Studies in Economic Theory,
19 |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Search Result 1