Differential Information Economies
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative eq...
| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
|---|---|
| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | , |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2005.
|
| Σειρά: | Studies in Economic Theory,
19 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
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