Conditionals, Information, and Inference International Workshop, WCII 2002, Hagen, Germany, May 13-15, 2002, Revised Selected Papers /

• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Kern-Isberner, Gabriele (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Rödder, Wilhelm (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Kulmann, Friedhelm (Επιμελητής έκδοσης)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2005.
• Σειρά: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 3301
• Θέματα: Computer science.; Mathematical logic.; Artificial intelligence.; Computer Science.; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics).; Mathematical Logic and Formal Languages.

 Conditionals are fascinating and versatile objects of knowledge representation. On the one hand, they may express rules in a very general sense, representing, for example, plausible relationships, physical laws, and social norms. On the other hand, as default rules or general implications, they constitute a basic tool for reasoning, even in the presence of uncertainty. In this sense, conditionals are intimately connected both to information and inference. Due to their non-Boolean nature, however, conditionals are not easily dealt with. They are not simply true or false — rather, a conditional “if A then B” provides a context, A, for B to be plausible (or true) and must not be confused with “A entails B” or with the material implication “not A or B.” This ill- trates how conditionals represent information, understood in its strict sense as reduction of uncertainty. To learn that, in the context A, the proposition B is plausible, may reduce uncertainty about B and hence is information. The ab- ity to predict such conditioned propositions is knowledge and as such (earlier) acquired information. The ?rst work on conditional objects dates back to Boole in the 19th c- tury, and the interest in conditionals was revived in the second half of the 20th century, when the emerging Arti?cial Intelligence made claims for appropriate formaltoolstohandle“generalizedrules.”Sincethen,conditionalshavebeenthe topic of countless publications, each emphasizing their relevance for knowledge representation, plausible reasoning, nonmonotonic inference, and belief revision. 

 Invited Papers -- What Is at Stake in the Controversy over Conditionals -- Reflections on Logic and Probability in the Context of Conditionals -- Acceptance, Conditionals, and Belief Revision -- Regular Papers -- Getting the Point of Conditionals: An Argumentative Approach to the Psychological Interpretation of Conditional Premises -- Projective Default Epistemology -- On the Logic of Iterated Non-prioritised Revision -- Assertions, Conditionals, and Defaults -- A Maple Package for Conditional Event Algebras -- Conditional Independences in Gaussian Vectors and Rings of Polynomials -- Looking at Probabilistic Conditionals from an Institutional Point of View -- There Is a Reason for Everything (Probably): On the Application of Maxent to Induction -- Completing Incomplete Bayesian Networks.