Internet and Network Economics Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007. Proceedings /
| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
|---|---|
| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | , |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2007.
|
| Σειρά: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
4858 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- WINE 2007
- Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History
- My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its Applications
- Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm
- The Computation of Equilibria
- A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization
- New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
- A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets
- An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria
- Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games
- Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets
- Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance
- Information Sharing Communities
- Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions
- Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions
- Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising
- Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search
- Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions
- Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction
- Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games
- Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics
- Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?
- On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems
- Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities
- Mechanism Design I
- False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
- Mechanism Design on Trust Networks
- Stochastic Mechanism Design
- A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks
- A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests
- A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below Cost
- PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution
- Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks
- Advertisement Pricing I
- Sponsored Search with Contexts
- Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions
- Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions
- Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids
- An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism ?-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget
- Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences
- Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities
- Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets
- Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes
- On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets
- Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games
- The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games
- Secure Relative Performance Scheme
- Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem
- The Wi-Fi Roaming Game
- On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games
- The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs
- A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game
- Group Dominant Strategies
- Weighted Boolean Formula Games
- Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games
- Mechanism Design II
- Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions
- Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems
- To Be or Not to Be (Served)
- Advertisement Pricing II
- Ad Auction Design and User Experience
- Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm
- Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search
- Pay-per-action Model for Online Advertising
- Public Advertisement Broker Markets
- Mechanism Design III
- K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation
- Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
- Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search
- On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
- Characterizing Truthful Market Design.
