Fairness in Bargaining and Markets

This book contributes to behavioral economic research on the central issue of social preferences, focusing on the implications of social fairness norms on the interaction of market participants. The author uses both game-theoretic and experimental methods to analyze the implications of social fairne...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Korth, Christian (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
Σειρά:Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 627
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
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245 1 0 |a Fairness in Bargaining and Markets  |h [electronic resource] /  |c by Christian Korth. 
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490 1 |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,  |x 0075-8442 ;  |v 627 
505 0 |a Bargaining Theory -- Game Theory and Fairness Preferences -- Reciprocity#x2014;An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -- Fairness Norms in Ultimatum Exchanges -- Fairness, Price Stickiness, and History Dependence in Decentralized Trade -- Generalizations and Extensions of the Decentralized Trade Model -- Price Rigidity in an Experimental Market. 
520 |a This book contributes to behavioral economic research on the central issue of social preferences, focusing on the implications of social fairness norms on the interaction of market participants. The author uses both game-theoretic and experimental methods to analyze the implications of social fairness norms on the outcomes of bilateral bargaining situations. It is shown that a preference for reciprocity is evolutionarily stable in a "game of life" that consists of bilateral bargaining situations. The fairness benchmark or reference that such a preference depends on is investigated through a classroom experiment. Furthermore, the book presents a theoretical analysis of a market model as well as an experimental laboratory study to explore the implications of fairness concerns for price formation in matching markets. 
650 0 |a Economic theory. 
650 0 |a Microeconomics. 
650 1 4 |a Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. 
650 2 4 |a Microeconomics. 
710 2 |a SpringerLink (Online service) 
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776 0 8 |i Printed edition:  |z 9783642022524 
830 0 |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,  |x 0075-8442 ;  |v 627 
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