Handbook on Approval Voting
Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical wor...
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | SpringerLink (Online service) |
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Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | Laslier, Jean-François (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Sanver, M. Remzi (Επιμελητής έκδοσης) |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2010.
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Σειρά: | Studies in Choice and Welfare,
|
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
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