Handbook on Approval Voting
Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical wor...
| Corporate Author: | SpringerLink (Online service) |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Laslier, Jean-François (Editor), Sanver, M. Remzi (Editor) |
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2010.
|
| Series: | Studies in Choice and Welfare,
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Similar Items
-
Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules /
by: Gehrlein, William V., et al.
Published: (2011) -
Mathematical Theory of Democracy
by: Tangian, Andranik
Published: (2014) -
Mathematical Methods in Economics and Social Choice
by: Schofield, Norman
Published: (2014) -
Voting Power and Procedures Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover /
Published: (2014) -
Economics and Computation An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division /
Published: (2016)