Handbook on Approval Voting

• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Laslier, Jean-François (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Sanver, M. Remzi (Επιμελητής έκδοσης)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
• Σειρά: Studies in Choice and Welfare,
• Θέματα: Political science.; Game theory.; Economic theory.; Public finance.; Economics.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.; Public Economics.; Political Science.; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.

Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical wor...