Collective Decision Making Views from Social Choice and Game Theory /
This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow’s Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to inf...
| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
|---|---|
| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | , |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2010.
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| Σειρά: | Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research,
43 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- From Black’s Advice and Arrow’s Theorem to the Gibbard–Satterthewaite Result
- The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists
- Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models
- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
- Rights Revisited, and Limited
- Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes
- Existence of a Dictatorial Subgroup in Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales, an Alternative Proof
- Making (Non-standard) Choices
- Puzzles and Paradoxes Involving Averages: An Intuitive Approach
- Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size: Member State Representation in the Council of the European Union
- Stabilizing Power Sharing
- Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games
- Networks, Information and Choice
- Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Properties of Their Status Quo Sets
- Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta–Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games.
