Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules /

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Gehrlein, William V. (Συγγραφέας), Lepelley, Dominique (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2011.
• Σειρά: Studies in Choice and Welfare,
• Θέματα: Political science.; Political economy.; Game theory.; Economic theory.; Public finance.; Economics.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.; Political Economy.; Public Economics.; Political Science.; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.

The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters’ preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange el...