Decision-Making in Committees Game-Theoretic Analysis /

Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? Thi...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Maaser, Nicola Friederike (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
Σειρά:Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 635
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
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100 1 |a Maaser, Nicola Friederike.  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Decision-Making in Committees  |h [electronic resource] :  |b Game-Theoretic Analysis /  |c by Nicola Friederike Maaser. 
264 1 |a Berlin, Heidelberg :  |b Springer Berlin Heidelberg,  |c 2010. 
300 |a XXII, 126 p. 26 illus.  |b online resource. 
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490 1 |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,  |x 0075-8442 ;  |v 635 
505 0 |a Games and Political Decisions -- Committees as Representative Institutions -- Robust Equal Representation -- Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation. 
520 |a Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions. 
650 0 |a Political science. 
650 0 |a Game theory. 
650 0 |a European Economic Community literature. 
650 1 4 |a Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Game Theory. 
650 2 4 |a Political Science. 
650 2 4 |a European Integration. 
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830 0 |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,  |x 0075-8442 ;  |v 635 
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