Decision-Making in Committees Game-Theoretic Analysis /
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? Thi...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2010.
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Σειρά: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
635 |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Games and Political Decisions
- Committees as Representative Institutions
- Robust Equal Representation
- Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation.