Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Peleg, Bezalel (Συγγραφέας), Peters, Hans (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
• Σειρά: Studies in Choice and Welfare,
• Θέματα: Game theory.; Economic theory.; Welfare economics.; Social sciences.; Economics.; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice.; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.; Methodology of the Social Sciences.
• Φυσική περιγραφή: XVIII, 154 p. 2 illus. online resource.
• ISBN: 9783642138751
• ISSN: 1614-0311

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.